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1. Introduction 
In this paper we develop a simple macro model to analyze a set of monetary 
issues that can arise when monetary, fiscal, and development policies become integrated.  
This is done for the specific case where a government finances a significant portion of its 
spending from resource revenues that are subject to external shocks and where the ability 
to alter both spending and taxes is limited in the short run.  One concrete example is that 
of oil rich developing economies that frequently finance both government operations and 
development plans through the sale of oil on world markets (subject to stochastic price 
and/or exchange rate shocks). Here monetary consequences arise through the government 
budget constraint and to the extent that the central bank manages its exchange rate 
(Obstfeld, 1982).  A second way that monetary policy becomes intermingled with 
government policy is when a country feels that its growth or development potential is 
held back by imperfectly functioning internal capital markets (see Levine, 1997).  In such 
cases, the central bank may choose to supplement internal capital markets by monetizing 
the loans made by the government to encourage higher levels of private or quasi-private 
domestic investment. These two issues are explored for their effects on price level and 
inflation rate stability. 
To analyze the conditions underlying monetary stability, the classic paper of 
Leeper (1991) is modified to allow the government to own the revenue stream associated 
with the natural resource and to use this revenue to fund some portion of government 
services.  Both to simplify presentation and set the stage for later application, we 
characterize the resource revenue as oil revenue. In addition to analyzing the effects that 
stochastic oil revenues may create for the government’s budget and balance of payments 
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positions, we consider the monetary consequences arising from underwriting private 
investment.  To focus on these issues, the model abstracts from population growth and 
technological change. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 The Representative Household 
The representative household in a community of size Nt = N is assumed to face 
the following maximization problem: 
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where respectively 
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Bb = are real per capital 
levels of private and public consumption, money and government bond holdings; 
tt iR +=1 , and tt π+=Π 1 are gross nominal interest and inflation rates; κθ and are the utility 
weights on real balances and government output and β  is the household’s subjective time 
discount rate. Pt is the price of both private and public consumption. For simplicity we 
normalize constant population size to N = 1 and abstract from changes in y and g through 
time. We then suppose that while government spending provides utility to consumers, 
households view its level as determined exogenously, as are period specific lump-sum tax 
payments, τt. The separable form of the utility function means that changes in 
government spending have no direct effect on the optimal levels of consumption or 
money holdings. Oil is assumed to be owned by the government and its revenues used to 
fund some part of government expenditure. Hence for the representative household g will 
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not equal tτ .  The community as a whole, however, is still subject to an aggregate 
resource constraint that takes the form: 
ygct =+             (3) 
The resource constraint together with the assumed constancy of y and g implies that ct = 
ct+1 = c.   
Finally, the maximization problem in (1) – (2) is subject also to the initial 
conditions, Mt = M0 and Btp = B0p at t = 0 and the transversality conditions for real money 
balances and government bonds.  The latter requires the net present value of government 
debt to equal zero. 
The first order conditions for the constrained intertemporal maximization problem 
described above can be written as: 
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where (4) is a version of the Fisher equation, ttt iR πρ +=≡−1 , where ρβ += 1
1  (and ρ is 
the rate of time preference and steady state real rate of interest). Equation (5) implies that 
the demand for money varies inversely with the nominal rate of interest .
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2.2 The Government Sector 
To simplify our analysis we assume that while the real output of the oil sector is 
constant through time, oil export revenues are received in U.S. dollars. Hence oil 
revenues in domestic currency, ORt, can be written as 
o
o
ttt yPeOR =         (6) 
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where, 0y is the constant level of oil production, te is exchange rate (the number of units of 
domestic currency per U.S. dollar), and otP is the oil price in U.S. dollars.  Real oil 
revenues are then 
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We now suppose that real oil revenues fluctuate through time because of 
stochastic changes in either the U.S. price of oil or the exchange rate. Moreover, we 
assume that these external shocks result in oil revenues following an AR(1) process: 
ttot oror ερ += − )ln()ln( 1         (8) 
where tε is a white noise disturbance reflecting random oil price and/or exchange rate 
shocks and ρ0 reflects their persistence over time. Written in terms of deviations from 
steady state values, this becomes: 
ttot roro ερ += −1ˆˆ         ),0(~ 2εσε Nt       (9) 
Next we incorporate oil revenues as a revenue source into the government budget 
constraint.  Grouping terms so that the left hand side represents the real value of 
government’s current deficit, dt,  
tt
t
p
tt
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where 
t
p
tt bi
Π
−− 11 is the current real value of the interest paid on the stock of government debt 
in the hands of the public at time t-1 and τt is the real value of non-inflationary taxes 
collected. Then whatever spending cannot be financed by oil revenues and lump-sum 
taxes must be financed through new government borrowing.  That is, 
t
p
ttttt ORBigPD −+−= −− 11)( τ        (11) 
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is the amount of new government borrowing needed for budgetary purposes, embodied in 
a new issuance of government bonds, Bt. These, in turn, must be held by either the central 
bank, Δ cbtB , or the public, Δ ptB , such that in the aggregate .
p
t
cb
tt BBB +=  For individuals 
to hold government debt willingly, the transversality condition must hold. This implies 
that at time t = 0, 
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so that any new bond financed government deficit must be fully repaid (in present value 
terms) through higher taxes, oil revenues and/or money creation sometime in the future.  
Finally we allow for the possibility that there may exist a positive level of 
privately held real government debt, (bp)ss ≥ 0 and a positive rate of inflation, πss in the 
steady state. The later yields the government a constant revenue stream of .
1
ss
ss
ss
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π
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1  
Hence in the steady state, the government will set lump-sum non-inflation tax collections 
such that government expenditures not covered by either oil revenues or inflation taxes 
are fully funded, i. e.,  
,
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represents the level of seigniorage revenue all in the steady state. 
In what follows we restrict our attention to cases where the steady state rates of 
expected and actual inflation are equal and constant.  In such states the nominal supply of 
high powered money and the price level will be growing at the same constant rate and 
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under flexible exchange rates, the exchange rate will be adjusting proportionally. With 
the money supply multiplier set equal to one so that Mt = Ht, it follows from (4) and (5) 
that the real stock of money is 
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This implies that the steady state level of real balances will vary inversely with the 
expected rate of inflation (since c, θ, and ρ are constant across steady state rates of 
inflation).  Then to the extent that transitory changes in oil revenues produce budget 
surpluses and deficits that are at least partially monetized, transitory changes in the 
money supply will produce transitory changes in the actual rate of inflation about its 
steady state level.   
Finally, the steady state real exchange rate is determined by the market clearing 
condition in the foreign exchange market when oil revenues are orss and other variables 
take their steady state values.  Transitory changes oil revenues will then generate 
offsetting transitory changes in the exchange rate if the central bank does not intervene in 
the foreign exchange market. To the extent that the central bank does intervene, there will 
be concomitant changes in the money supply.  
 
2.3 Policy considerations 
Even though the transversality and the no ponzi game condition require the 
government to repay all new borrowings from the public over the long run, it remains 
possible, and possibly desirable, for the government to issue new government debt in the 
short run to smooth spending and/or taxes intertemporally (á la Barro). Thus if monetary 
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policy is set independently to stabilize prices each period, either the private holding of 
government debt or lump-sum taxes must respond to altered current circumstances.  
Alternatively, should fiscal tax plans be set independent of current budget outcomes (for 
example, if taxes were unalterable and additional private holdings of government debt not 
feasible), then changes in money would be needed to offset external changes in the 
government’s budget. Implicitly, an inflation tax is needed to finance desired 
expenditures.  Hence for the model to be uniquely determinate (in Leeper’s sense), one 
policy must accommodate the other. Only then can one of the policies be truly 
independent of current conditions. 
  We close the model by specifying the two policy instruments used by 
government.  Here monetary policy could be modeled by having the central bank set 
either the interest rate or the quantity of high powered money; while fiscal policy requires 
the government to set the level of g and the intertemporal timing of taxes.  Because we 
are interested in how external oil revenue shocks can spillover into money supply 
changes, we focus on high powered money as the central bank’s policy instrument.   
Beginning with the stock of high powered money issued by the central bank, the 
real value of its supply at any point in time is, 
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where cbtb is the real value of the stock of government bonds held by the central bank at 
time t and tfa is the real value of foreign assets held by the bank (essentially foreign 
8 
 
exchange).  It follows that the real stock of high powered money can change for two 
reasons that might be affected by stochastic changes in natural resource revenue — the 
changes oil revenues produce in the government’s current budget deficit and the changes 
they produce in the country’s balance of payments position.  
Somewhat more generally, the nominal supply of money will increase (decrease) 
whenever the central bank purchases (sells) government bonds.  This can happen in our 
economy for three different reasons.  First the central bank may purchase (and so 
monetize) some proportion, α, of the bond issue used to fund the current operating deficit, 
dt.  Second, the central bank may purchase the government bonds issued to supplement 
financially constrained quasi-private institutions and organizations. These are often asset 
transactions not included as part of the government’s flow budget position. Nevertheless, 
whenever the central bank purchases the government bonds issued to fund these loans, 
the central bank both monetizes the debt while supplementing the level of liquidity in 
domestic financial markets.  In what follows we assume that the central bank underwrites 
a constant real level of replacement investment, .yμ   Finally, the central bank may itself 
engage in open market operations to counter expected inflation and hence actively pursue 
an inflation target. To counter excess expected inflation the central bank will sell some 
proportion, γ, of its holdings of government debt to reduce the stock of high powered 
money in circulation (so increasing the stock of government debt held by the public). 
Putting these three points together we have 
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where 0,,1 ≥≥ γμα .  Then substituting for dt from (10), we find, 
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As we saw earlier, the supply of money also changes whenever the central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market and buys or sells foreign exchange to prevent 
full exchange rate adjustment. Then given that stochastic changes in oil revenue generate 
excess supplies and demands for foreign exchange at current market rates, the money 
supply changes to the extent that the central bank intervenes to prevent full exchange rate 
adjustment (Kouri and Porter 1986, Kamas 1986, and Kim 1995).  Hence, assuming that 
some such intervention takes place, 
 ),( sst
t
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P
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where 01 ≥≥ψ  is the portion of the balance of payments shock that is monetized, 
equaling zero if the central bank doesn’t intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
Combining these reasons, the change in the stock of money [from (14)] becomes 
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The assumptions made to describe the change in high powered money also imply 
changes in the real values of both the total stock of government bonds and the proportion 
held by the public. Moreover, in addition to the influences just discussed, the 
government’s fiscal strategy may involve an active strategy of deliberately adjusting non-
inflation taxes to repurchase outstanding government debt to maintain the real value of 
government debt.  In doing so the government alters the intertemporal timing of its non-
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inflation taxes.  Hence if we add the possibility of active fiscal intervention, so that the 
government chooses to repurchase some proportion, φ, of the discrepancy between the 
outstanding stock of privately held government debt and its steady state level, then 
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and substituting in for td , 
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Finally, fiscal choices are often constrained by political and technical considerations that 
result in expenditure commitments and non-inflation taxes being fixed in the short run.  
We represent this as, 
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Implicitly non-inflation tax levels are set to cover the steady state expenditures that 
cannot be financed by steady state oil revenues and (expected) inflation taxes and are 
assumed to have limited ability to respond to current deficits.  That is, non-inflation taxes 
cannot respond to the current state of the budget and thus the problems created this period 
by stochastic oil revenues. Rather it can respond only with a lag to the consequences 
these stochastic changes have on the outstanding stock of government bonds held by the 
public. 
Finally, by substituting the tax policy in (21) back into (20) we can solve for the 
change in the stock of government debt held privately as 
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Similarly, we can substitute (21) back into (18) to find the change in the stock of 
(high-powered) money as, 
[ ]
( )
( )( )
t
p
tsse
t
ss
t
t
sspp
t
ss
sspssp
ttss
ss
ss
ss
t
t
p
tsse
tt
t
sspp
tss
ss
ss
ss
ss
sspss
t
s
t
bororbbbibihy
oror
bibbhorbiy
P
H
Π−−−−+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
−−Π
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π+=
−−+
Π−−+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π++Π−+=
Δ
−−−−
−
−
−
1111
1
1
1
)()()(
)()()(
ππγαψϕαπαμ
ψαψ
ππγαϕπαμ
 (23) 
Here we see that even if all variables converge to their steady state values, the change in 
the money supply will not equal zero.  Rather, ௱ு
௉೟
ൌ ߤݕ ൅ ቀఈగ
ೞೞ
௽ೞೞ
ቁ ݄௦௦ ൐ 0, so that (using 
footnote 1) we can solve for the steady state value as ss
ss
ss yh πα
μ
)1( −
Π= .2 Hence in this 
economy, the steady state will be characterized by a constant steady state rate of inflation 
tied to the government’s use of money creation to fund a portion of state (or quasi-
private) investment and its role as a tax source in the budget.  To the extent that income 
growth was present in the model, say due to a positive rate of technical change, the 
inflation rate would be proportionately lower.   
 The more general point is that neither the use of the inflation tax nor the 
monetization of government lending in support of efforts to speed development by 
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underwriting private finance need necessarily cause instability.  Rather, a higher inflation 
tax and/or a higher subsidy rate will result in a higher steady state rate of inflation but this 
need not imply accommodization by the central bank nor an accelerating rate of inflation. 
 
3. Linearization about the steady state 
After linearizing our four equation model (equations (4), (5), (22) and (23)) about 
its steady state, the motion of the system can be reduced to the following two equations: 
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Note that the effect of a positive oil shock on expected future inflation [in (24)] is 
ambiguous at impact, depending on the size of the parameter governing monetization 
through the government budget constraint, α, relative to the size of the parameter 
describing the central bank’s unwillingness to let the exchange rate fully adjust to 
changes in the balance of payments position, ψ.  On the other hand, the impact effect of 
an oil shock on the outstanding stock of government debt (held by the public) [in (25)] is 
straightforward--a positive oil shock is used to reduce the outstanding stock of privately 
held government debt.   
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To examine the full general equilibrium consequences of oil shocks we follow 
Ireland (2004) and set up our system as a DSGE model and apply the Blanchard-Kahn 
(1980) method.  In our case, this rewrites the above equations in state space form as: 
 
1
143
1
1
0
ˆ
ˆ
0ˆ
ˆ
+
−
+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
t
t
p
t
ot
p
t
ro
bSS
ro
b ερ                                                                         (26) 
in combination with the observation equation: 
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The Si parameters in (26) and (27) represent combinations of the deep parameters of the 
model.3 The state and observation equations are then used in conjunction with the set of 
calibrated parameter values presented below to investigate the impulse response of 
inflation to oil shocks across different policy periods in Iran’s recent history. Looking 
across these divergent historical periods, we seek to explain the different ways that oil 
shocks have impacted domestic money prices and inflation rates. 
 
4.     Calibrating the model 
In this section we describe how the magnitudes of the various structural and 
policy parameters of the model were determined using data from post-revolutionary Iran, 
our example of a resource intensive emerging economy.  In undertaking this calibration, 
we have found that there are three distinct policy periods: first, the period immediately 
following the Iranian revolution and lasting through the war with Iraq (from 1979-1988); 
second, the period following the Iraqi War and before the government sanctioned the 
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issuance of government debt (1989-1993); and finally the most recent time period (from 
1994-2006) where the government’s ability to issue new government bonds (to the 
outside public) allowed the nonmonetary financing of government deficits.4 These 
differences across periods suggest to us that policy response to government budget and 
balances of payments deficits and surpluses have been somewhat asymmetric.5 Whatever 
the reason, by adapting the model to these distinct periods, we can allow the model to 
illustrate the distinct effects that different active and passive government policy responses 
to the problems created by stochastic oil revenues have had on inflation.  
With this background, we began by using the data from the entire 1979-2006 time 
interval (to maximize our degrees of freedom) to model the oil shocks impacting the 
economy.  The AR(1) oil revenue process was then derived by first deflating oil values 
by the CPI to find real oil revenues and then detrending the logarithmic value of real oil 
revenues by regressing it on a constant and time. The residual from this regression 
became the stochastic deviation of real oil revenues from their long run value. By 
estimating an AR(1) process on these residuals we found the values for ߩ௢ and ߪ௢ 
presented in Table 1.  Implicitly we are assuming that the outside stochastic process 
underlying oil revenues stayed constant for our entire period (unlike the changes in policy 
regime).   
Then to calibrate the portion of the natural resource shock that is monetized 
through intervention in the foreign exchange market, ψ, we first took the residual of the 
AR(1) process for the stochastic part of real oil revenues for the entire 1979-2006 period. 
Then we calculated the ratio of the net change in the foreign assets held by the central 
bank to those residuals. In the early parts of our time period, the values of ψ were close to 
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zero while in the latter stages, the ratio sometimes exceeded one.  Since our ratio is 
bounded by one and zero, the upper bound was adopted when the ratio exceeded one.  
With these adjustments, the value used in each period was the period average. The large 
value of this parameter in the later period reflects the inability of the central bank to 
sterilize the huge flow of oil revenues that arose more recent time periods.  
To calibrate α, the parameter describing the proportion of the deficit that is 
monetized, we faced the problem of not having independent data on the size of the 
government deficit.  Hence to approximate its size, we added to the government’s net 
borrowing from the central bank a set of other government off-budget revenue sources 
not accounted for directly in the government’s flow deficit (for example, the net receipt 
of interest on foreign loans, the sale of government assets, etc.).  To do this we then 
added net government borrowing from the outside public. This last term was relevant 
only for the 1994 to 2006 time period--before 1994 outside government borrowing was 
not used. This proxy for the size of the government deficit was then divided into the 
government’s net borrowing from the central bank to derive a value of α for each year.  
Its average value in each of our three periods was the calibrated value of α used for that 
time period.6 
 For the role played by the central bank in supplementing financial intermediation, 
the parameter ߤ was calculated as the change in net public corporation and agency debt to 
the central bank as a ratio of GDP.  Its average value in each of the three periods was the 
value of ߤ used for that time period.  In Iran, the inability of the central bank to sell either 
its own bonds or Iranian government bonds prior to 1994 means that γ will have equaled 
zero.  In the period following 1994, and particularly between 2000 and 2006, the central 
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bank does appear to have issued its own debt, so re-absorbing high powered money.  The 
value of gamma used in the latest time period then reflects the average value of the ratio 
of new central bank debt to GDP in this period.   
  As P´erez and Hiebert (2004) among others have shown, some parameters in the 
fiscal rule will be determined by the requirement that the stability condition for the 
Blanchard Kahn method can be satisfied.  In our case, the policy parameter φ is not 
always observed (separately) and needs to be set so that the model can converge to its 
steady state.  Hence the imposing of stability on the analysis generates a domain of values 
for consistent with that requirement.  Recognizing that government bonds were not used 
before 1994, the coefficient value for government bond repurchases to keep stable the 
size of the national debt, φ, was zero for the first two periods and then chosen to be 
relatively small at 0.05 for the third.   
Lastly we assigned to β the value of 0.99 and to θ, the weight given to (the log of) 
real money holdings relative to consumption in the utility function, the value 0.04. The 
former is traditional for the literature and corresponds to a steady state (annual) real 
interest rate of about 4%, while the latter was chosen primarily to avoid the problem of 
sunspots.7 The full set of calibrated values are summarized in Table 1 below.     
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Finally, the values used for steady state per capita real GDP, per capita 
consumption, inflation, the interest rate and real oil revenues relative to GDP were 
calculated as the average value of these variables in each of the specified periods. Table 2 
reports these values. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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5. Simulation Results 
Using these values in the DGSE model of equations (25) and (26), we show in 
Figure 1 below the impulse responses of inflation to a positive one standard deviation oil 
shock that are implied for each of our three time periods.  Given these calibrated values, 
the results show a remarkable difference in policy response across the three periods.  In 
all three periods there is an expansionary effect on the money supply and thus inflation 
following a positive oil shock.  This has arisen in the first and third periods from the 
central bank’s unwillingness to let the exchange rate float and an inability to sterilize 
foreign oil revenues under a positive oil shock.  In the middle period, the same type of 
inflationary response has arisen rather from the monetization of budget deficits following 
a series of negative oil shocks.   
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The more important point, however, is that implicitly or explicitly the economic 
policies adopted in the most recent time period have made the inflation rate in the Iranian 
economy increasingly susceptible to oil price shocks.  While the economy has not 
become any less quick in its adjustment to oil shocks, reflected in the almost proportional  
adjustment of inflation in the post 2000 time period, the impact effect itself is now 
considerably stronger than in any of the earlier time periods.  In our simulations, the 
response is between three and five times larger than it was over the 1979 – 1993 time 
period.  Explained in terms of our model, this dramatic response reflects a changed 
approach to exchange rate policy (a rapid rise in the parameter φ) that now exhibits much 
greater resistance to exchange rate movements. This resistance, together with cumulative 
impact of much larger sized positive oil shocks in this period, has had a significant effect 
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on the size of the balance of payments effects that have arisen in recent periods.  
Together they have made the Iranian economy not only more susceptible to higher rates 
of inflation but more prone to extended variations in its level. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper we have developed a simple DSGE model to illustrate how those 
economies that face restrictions in their ability to alter government spending and taxation 
in the short run and cannot borrow easily (perhaps because of incompletely developed 
internal capital markets) can find external fluctuations in resource revenues producing 
unexpected variations in their internal money supply and ultimately in their inflation rate.  
The main channels for these effects run through the government budget constraint and 
through the country’s balance of payments position (should the country choose to 
suppress exchange rate movements).   
 While these general circumstances are likely to be relevant to a large number of 
countries, we have chosen to apply our structure to the Iranian economy over the 1979 -
2006 time period.  To do so we calibrated the model for three somewhat separate policy 
regimes in Iran’s recent past.  After doing so we were able to illustrate how the different 
policy choices made (as embodied in the different calibrated values of our analysis) have 
produced quite different inflationary responses to external oil shocks.  Perhaps most 
dramatically, our calibrated values in the third period imply that the central bank’s 
inability to sterilize foreign oil revenues more than compensates for the contractionary 
effects that would arise from budget surpluses being used to pay-off government debt 
with the central bank.  In turn this implies a significant increase in the impulse that oil 
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shocks have given to Iranian inflation.  It is this dramatic change in the central bank’s 
ability to sterilize accumulated foreign dollars from oil price increases together with the 
dramatic recent rise in oil prices that has resulted in the large inflationary effect that is the 
striking feature of our final period.       
 
Figure 1 
 
The solid impulse response line applies to 1979-1988 
The dotted impulse response function applies to 1989-1993 
The dashed response curve represents 1994-2006 
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Table1 
 
Calibrated values for the parameters of the model 
1994-2006 1989-1993 1979-1988 
 
Parameters 
 
0.99 0.99 0.99 β 
.04 .04 .04 θ 
0.71 0.71 0.71 ߩ୭ 
0.4 0.4 0.4 ߪ୭ 
0.34 0.52 0.74 α 
0.004 0.01 0.013 μ 
0.074 0 0 Γ 
0.05 0 0 Φ 
0.48 0.01 0.12 Ψ 
 
 
Table 2   
Steady State Values 
 
1994-2006 1989-1993 1979-1988  Variables 
5.22 4.2 4.4 ݕሺݏݏሻ 
3.4 2.8 3.3 ܿሺݏݏሻ 
0.1785 0.1712 0.1718 ߨሺݏݏሻ 
0.137 0.091 0.109 or(ss) 
0.115 0.082 0.082 i(ss) 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  Note that since t
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which in 
turn would equal zero if πss = 0. 
2. This implies that ss
ss
ssp yb π
μ Π=)(
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3.  A set of detailed notes outlining the specifics of the derivations is available upon 
request.
 
 
4.  In the first year, these bonds were issued to finance some of the investment projects 
undertaken by government associations. 
 
5. One interpretation of the asymmetry in policy across this period lies in the political 
incentives faced by government. That is, when a negative oil shock generates a short run 
budget deficit requiring borrowing (for a government with little short run tax flexibility), 
the government may find it considerably easier politically to borrow from the central 
bank than from the outside public.  On the other hand, when the shock is positive, the 
resulting budget surplus is more likely to be seen as an opportunity to pay off external 
public borrowing.  Hence a negative oil shock is more likely to be associated with a rise 
in the money supply through the government budget constraint than is the corresponding 
positive shock likely to be associated with a decline. Inversely, the delayed effect of 
money supply increases on prices (and the positive stimulus this provides to output) 
makes the government more likely to resist the fall in the exchange rate following a 
positive oil shock.  The contractionary pressures associated with a negative shock make 
the government more likely to acquiesce in the rise in the exchange rate.  
 
6.  From equation (24) it apparent that increasing the size of theta will decrease the size 
of all coefficients.  This leads to both eigenvalues falling below one so generating the 
sunspot issue. 
 
 
 
7.  The calibrated values reflect the policy asymmetry mentioned above.  That is, the 
positive oil shocks in years 2000/1 and 2004/6 did not result in an overall demonetization 
from the implied government budget surplus.   
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